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Abstract
Truly Ad Hoc wireless networks where a spontaneous formation of a network occurs and there is no
prior knowledge of nodes to each other present significant security challenges, especially as entirely
online configuration of nodes with encryption keys must be performed. Utilising threshold
cryptography in this type of MANET can greatly increase the security by requiring servers to
collaborate to form a single Certificate Authority (CA). In this type of CA responsibility for certificate
services is shared between a threshold of servers, greatly increasing security and making attack
against the CA considerably more difficult. Choosing which nodes to take on the role of a CA server
can have a significant impact on the efficiency of the network, and the success of certificate requests.
This research uses simulation to test different rules for choosing nodes to become servers based on
their location within the network. Results show that choosing the best server location rules for
particular configurations is essential in ensuring both robust security and efficient running of the
network.
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INTRODUCTION
A MANET is a wireless network of nodes that directly communicate with each other without
messages passing through a central access point. The limited radio range of wireless
communications can be overcome by nodes located between the 2 prospective communicating
parties passing on the messages in ‘hops’ so that in theory, messages can travel unlimited distances
across networks. Ad Hoc networking has significant advantages where networks are required to
form quickly, often in areas where other communication infrastructure is not available. As a truly ad
hoc network is entirely unplanned, generally the participating nodes will have no security
configurations before network formation. Security is vital to any network to ensure that the 5
attributes that fall under the umbrella term of security can be met – confidentiality, authentication,
availability, reliability and non‐repudiation (Zhou and Haas 1999). Truly Ad Hoc networks present
significant challenges in implementing robust security in an efficient and effective manner amongst
entirely equal nodes after network formation.
All five attributes of security can be achieved to a reasonable level by a robust encryption key
management system (KMS). For a MANET to utilise asymmetric encryption, at least for initial key
exchange between 2 communicating parties, a key management server must be utilised to act as a
certificate authority (CA). Once the server is selected, it can receive requests for encryption keys and
certificates, and can verify certificates of prospective communicating parties. However, the key
management server must be readily available for the creation, distribution, verification and if
necessary destruction of certificates. For a very small MANET, a single server may be sufficient.
However, having one node with all information about encryption keys in the network is extremely
insecure. This is especially true if the MANET is a truly ad hoc network where any node may be
permitted to join the network. The selection of the server at random means a dishonest node may
be chosen to take on the role. If no prior behaviour of the node has been monitored, then no
opportunity to notice misbehaviour exists. A dishonest server with absolute authority over the keys
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for a network has authority to refuse key requests and to revoke keys by refusing to verify a
certificate is valid. One method to increase availability of the CA server is to replicate the server by
designating more nodes as servers who then periodically exchange their certificate information so
that each server in the network contains the same information. Whilst this significantly increases
availability of CA services, it correspondingly significantly reduces security as a successful
compromise of any server gleans all necessary information to compromise other nodes.
The desire to provide high security, high availability of the CA and to provide redundancy should a
server fail for any reason, can be implemented with the use of threshold cryptography. This can be
difficult in a MANET which may be highly dynamic and have constrained devices (Alkema 2013).
Threshold cryptography involves dividing the task of creating encryption keys and their
corresponding certificates amongst several servers who must collaborate to perform key
management tasks. Additionally, should misbehaviour of a node be reported to the CA, the same
collaboration is performed to eject a node from the network. The threshold refers to the number of
nodes that must collaborate. If there are m nodes in a network with n servers, then k servers are
required for certificate services. This is written as: k<=n<m. While threshold cryptography is very
effective, the efficiency of the design is not always considered. The location of the servers has shown
to have a significant effect on the efficient running of the network (Yang, Zeng et al. 2007). In a
MANET where public key infrastructure (PKI) is utilised, servers can be very busy issuing certificates
and verifying certificates every time 2 nodes wish to communicate. For a network grows in numbers
rapidly, certificate requests are frequent and should result in a successful certificate issuance to
avoid repeated requests. Further, as malicious nodes can be ejected, effectively by voting to eject
amongst the servers, each new conversation between nodes should be preceded by a check that the
party’s certificates are still valid. This means that efficiency of communications to and among the CA
nodes is vital in ensuring that message passing is not hampered by continual key messages to and
from servers caused by inefficiency.
EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN
The SKYE protocol was chosen as the test protocol for server location comparisons. This protocol is
relatively recent and a brief description of its key management processes follows. A more thorough
examination of the protocol can be found in (Nisbet and Rashid 2009).
1. 20% of the nodes in the MANET are designated as servers.
2. The threshold of server nodes is selected. This figure is tuneable for the network where security
and efficiency can be traded with each other.
3. This percentage of server rules is overridden until sufficient servers are present. When a
network is forming, enforcing this rule would require early nodes to wait until sufficient nodes
exist to meet the threshold. For example, 20% servers with a threshold of 5 requires 25 nodes in
the network before communication can begin. Therefore, this rule is overridden until there are
sufficient nodes, so that in this example, the first 5 nodes will all take on server roles and
another server will not be designated until there are 30 nodes.
4. A node requesting a certificate contacts the closest server. The closest is the server that is the
fewest hops away.
5. The first server is responsible for contacting the other servers. Each of those servers returns
their portion of the certificate to the first server.
6. The first server returns all portions of the certificate to the requester.
7. The requester generates the key pair and signature from the returned parts.
8. The first server advises all servers in the network to update their certificate list with the
successful issuance of the certificate.
There are generally two approaches to this type of certificate request. The requester may request
each of the k servers directly who then reply directly to the requester. This method is used in the
MOCA protocol (Yi and Kravets 2003), However, the advantage of having a server receive a unicast
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request is that the server takes responsibility for contacting the other servers. By receiving the
required number of parts from the k‐1 servers and adding its own part, the server knows that a
request has been successful and can safely update the certificate list. This method is used in Zhou
and Hass’ unnamed protocol (Zhou and Haas 1999), and with a slight modification to the MOCA
protocol in SEKM (Wu, Wu et al. 2005). If a request is sent directly from a requester to k servers,
then essentially it is the same but with the requester taking on the role as the first contacted server.
When groups of nodes are served by a group leader alone, the mobility of the nodes can hamper
efficiency. In Chauhan and Sanger’s work, they found that mobility had an influence on the node
that should be chosen as the group leader (Chauhan and Sanger 2012). They included the mobility of
the server node, battery power and behaviour of the node when assessing the suitability to become
or remain a server. Here, the mobility caused inefficiency when contact was lost meaning that the
ability to exchange roles between servers and non‐servers was an attribute that was vital to
maintaining the efficiency within the network. If the entire network is treated as a group, then
efficiency can be enhanced by looking at number of 1‐hop neighbours rather than mobility alone.
One interesting approach to choosing servers is proposed by Guo, Ma, Wang and Yang. Their scheme
utilises selection of nodes as servers by offering an incentive to be honest (Guo, Ma et al. 2013).
Those nodes displaying the most honest behaviour are then chosen as servers. Whilst this scheme
attempts to maintain efficiency of the network by ensuring honesty of servers is enforced, the
selection can suffer from poorly placed servers if those are the one displaying the most honest
behaviour.
The SKYE protocol is distinguished from most other MANET KMS protocols by having many tuneable
parameters that can be chosen on initial formation of the network or adjusted as the network
grows. The parameters manipulate settings so that efficiency and security can be adjusted to suit the
application. Some applications require high security and are prepared to compromise on efficiency
whilst others require high efficiency where security is less of a concern. Whilst increasing the
number of servers required to form a CA increases security, the extra communication overhead as
each server is added reaches a point where efficiency is severely affected with little value to security.
For example, requiring 10 servers to cooperate to form a CA may give high resistance to attack.
However, requiring 11 servers will make little difference but may significantly decrease efficiency.
Simulations were performed to identify a threshold where performance degraded to the point that
the certificate process was so inefficient as to be unworkable. This was found to be 5 servers as an
acceptable maximum, however simulations were run to a value of 12 servers for the sake of
thoroughness. For a network requiring relatively low security, 2 servers was the minimum required
and so a range of 2 – 5 servers was found to be the effective range. Additionally, coping with node
misbehaviour must be rigorously enforced as misbehaviour can occur at any level within the
network (Wenjia, Joshi et al. 2010).
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Figure 1. Certificate issuance – 5 servers required

In figure 1, the node at the top has requested a certificate from the server 1 hop away. This server
has contacted 4 more servers and then returned all 5 certificate shares to the requester. The
requested then assembles the shares and calculates the key pairs.
A method for evaluating security along the certificate request chain was implemented directly as
that designed by the developers of MOCA. Called Composite Key Management, part of this scheme
requires each node in the chain to constantly evaluate its trust in the previous node in the chain.
This value begins at full trust of 1.0 and each apparent misbehavior reduces the trust by 0.1. This
value can be set for the network and is tuneable for the application requirement, with a higher value
adding security. A value of 0.1 would indicate considerable tolerance to perceived misbehaviour,
with a value of 0.9 very strict and possibly punishing false positives to misbehaviour with complaints
to the servers and eventually ejection from the network of that node. Each node takes the calculated
trust value for the certificate request and uses a formula to multiply its trust value. If the server
receiving the request finds the calculated trust value is below the required level, the request is
ignored and a re‐request must be made. Increasing security can therefore be achieved by increasing
the value of k and increasing the trust threshold for the certificate chain.
Efficiency in the network is vital, especially as nodes join and traffic volumes grow. By carefully
selecting the placement of the servers, efficiency can be significantly increased. If efficiency is not a
primary concern, then this increased efficiency can be traded against adding more servers to
increase security. The placement of the servers therefore has considerable benefits to the network
efficiency.
Simulations were performed to compare results for different rules relating to server locations. These
rules were used when the network forms and when additional servers are required to maintain the
correct percentage of servers. There were 6 distinct rules implemented:
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Random: List the non‐server nodes in the network and randomly choose one to become a
server.
Least: Find the non‐server node with the least number of neighbours and designate that node as
a server.
Least Update: At every update period of 1 second, find the non‐server node with the least
number of neighbours. If it is a server, take no action. If a non‐server designate that node as a
server.
Most: Find the non‐server node with the most number of neighbours and designate that node as
a server.
Most Update: Find the non‐server node with the most number of neighbours and designate that
node as a server. If it is a server, take no action. If a non‐server designate that node as a server.
Cluster: Find a non‐server node that is the neighbour of a server and designate that node as a
server. In this way, servers will initially all be neighbours of each other so that a large cluster of
servers forms.

The SKYE protocol was simulated using a custom built wireless network simulator written in Matlab.
The results for 10 simulations were averaged to eliminate as much random variation as possible
within the available timeframe, so that 66 results required 660 simulations. The hopping of
messages from nodes requesting certificates to the server during inter‐server communication may
be affected by misbehaving nodes. Calculating the level of trust along the certificate chain and
presenting the calculated trust gives confidence that a message is genuine and unaffected by
misbehaving nodes. Raising the trust level required will increase security with the penalty of greater
number of certificates being refused, while lowering the required level has the opposite effect. This
adds a level of security within the network for certificate requests. The simulation area was set at
2.5km square to simulate a large urban area that had been rendered almost flat. This meant that
wireless signals could travel equally well in all directions. Figure 2 shows the simulation area with
several wireless nodes and has the minimum threshold set at 4 servers. Nodes represented as stars
are servers and a single node out of range of another node has a circle drawn around it at 300
metres representing the radio range. Only nodes in networks with at least 4 servers have received
certificates.

Figure 2. Wireless networks with 4 servers required

The number of likely attacks against a network will depend on the environment, members and non‐
members of the network and the use for the network. As a general figure, 6% of nodes were
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designated as malicious nodes. These nodes regularly failed to pass on messages and had their trust
by their neighbours reduced as they did so. The longer the chain that a message passes through, the
higher the likelihood a malicious node would be encountered and the message or certificate request
would fail to arrive. Messages were randomly sent between 2 nodes in the network giving malicious
nodes frequent opportunities to misbehave. It is therefore of considerable advantage for a number
of reasons for message hops from source to destination to have the shortest path possible. Any
reduction in the number of hops required to reach a destination has significant benefits.






Fewer transmissions tying up network airtime.
Reduction in battery use of devices.
Shorter time to accomplish the task of communication or certificate services.
Less chance of encountering a malicious node that misbehaves with the message.
Greater chance of successful certificate issuance.

Figure 3. Wireless network with Cluster Rule with and without communication lines

Figure 3 shows 2 images of the same network which has k set to 5. In the first image the lines are
removed to more clearly show the clustering of the servers. One large network has formed with 3
distinct clusters allowing nodes to contact a server in the cluster closest to them and all
collaboration between the servers to take place within the cluster, most often with one hop
neighbours. With a network protocol that requires all certificate services to be performed after
network establishment, the process of requesting a certificate and successfully receiving the
certificate must be as efficient as possible. Any method to increase efficiency without compromising
security greatly increases the uses the protocol has, especially with a protocol such as SKYE where
any node wishing to join the network is permitted to do so. The certificate issuance process utilising
threshold cryptography by k servers cooperating, requires k servers to be easily contactable and that
the fewest total hops for the certificate issuance can be achieved. The process adopted by SKYE
utilises what the author has dubbed the Threshold Optimised MANET (TOM) to identify rules that
should be in place for the server locations, dependent on the value of k. If k is set to 1, then a single
server has full authority over certificate services and threshold cryptography is not employed.
Therefore, the minimum value of k was set to 2. As the value of k is increased, the security of
certificate issuance and revocation is increased. As a thorough comparison of the server location
rules involving a wide value of k was desirable, experiments were conducted with k values ranging
from 2 to 12.
RESULTS
When only 2 servers were required, the rule made little difference to the chances of success for a
certificate request. In figure 4 the random plot follows approximately the centre of the 6 rules.
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Figure 4. Success rates and hop counts with 2 servers required

As the network grows in numbers and members, spreading the nodes randomly throughout the
network was both effective in terms of relatively short hops and chances of success. As the number
of servers required increased, success rates drop and hop counts increase.

Figure 5. Success rates 4 servers required

With 4 servers required, this has changed for success rates and hops with the Most Update rule
beginning to perform much more efficiently. In figure 5 the Most Update rule performs best at all
trust levels but is most noticeable in the middle levels of 0.3 to 0.6. As the servers required is raised,
the performance of the rules becomes much more divergent. In figure 6, results for k of 2 to 12 is
shown and detailed results are shown in table 1.
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Figure 6. Success rates 2‐12 servers required with 0.4 trust

With k of 6, the network overall is beginning to perform inefficiently requiring the trust threshold to
be kept very low or the chances of a successful certificate issuance become very unlikely. Table 1
shows the certificate success rates for 2‐12 server required with the trust threshold set to 0.4. Only
the Most Update rule imposed above 6 servers would permit a trust threshold to be at 0.4 and then
with only a 35% chance of success.
Table 1. Success Rates for Trust of 0.4

Servers
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Random Least Least Update Most Most Update Cluster
70
54
36
29
19
10
12
9
5
5
4

65
49
30
22
14
12
9
7
6
4
3

68
47
35
25
16
13
10
8
6
4
4

77
56
41
30
23
16
12
8
5
6
5

77
60
65
55
50
35
35
30
28
23
26

68
50
35
28
15
13
13
7
7
7
5

With a server threshold of more than 6 or a trust threshold of greater than 0.4, success rates and
hop counts deteriorate to an unacceptable level. Only the Most Update rule is viable and remains
viable with lower trust thresholds right up to and possibly beyond a k of 12. Whilst this looks
encouraging, a significant drawback of updating rules is the intensive message passing required. In
this case, the server location rules were checked every 1 second, and for Most Update, if a server
was found to have fewer neighbors than a non‐server, an exchange of roles was enforced.
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Figure 7.Server role exchanges with trust of 0.4

Figure 7 shows the number of role exchanges over the 10 minutes of simulation run time for k of 2
to 12. The information required to make this decision requires every node in the network to advise
the servers of their number of one‐hop neighbors. For a large network, this could involve hundreds
of messages hopping across networks to servers every second on the chance that an exchange is
necessary. Decreasing the update period would ease this slightly but at the expense of keeping the
rule strictly enforced. Whilst clearly this increases efficiency, the overhead is extensive and would
most likely not be warranted.
CONCLUSION
Whilst security of networks is always a consideration, security generally compromises the efficiency
of the network. Generally, the higher the level of security, the more inefficient the network tends to
be. This is especially true in threshold cryptography where message passing between servers is
necessary for every certificate request. The results from the simulations show that efficiency can be
significantly increased by choosing the correct server location rules for the network size and member
numbers. The Most Update rule proves to be significantly more efficient than the others. However,
the high overhead in network resources required to enforce the rule may not always be warranted.
Constant swapping of roles and encryption key information between servers and non‐servers
reduces security and significantly increases the number of messages exchanged, meaning that unless
there is an overriding reason for KMS efficiency being the priority in the network, this rule is unlikely
to be commonly warranted. The next best choice is the Most rule which proves best among the
other 5 rules with none of the drawbacks of the updated rules. By implementing a rule that provides
high security and relatively high efficiency, the network is more useful in a greater number of
applications. These results provide a guide for network administration that allows for best choices to
be made with varying implementations.
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